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1. Background and a puzzle 
Klima (1964) described the distribution of Negative Polarity Items (any, ever, lift 
a finger, give a damn, . . .  ) in terms of two diacritics : [+I-affective], characterizing 
(non-)licensing environments, and [+1- NPI], characterizing the items themselves . 
Ladusaw (1980) argued that [+affective] is a semantic property, not a diacritic: all 
NPI-licensing contexts are Downward Entailing (DE) - and possibly must meet 
further conditions as well (see also Heim 1 984; Linebarger 1 980; Progovac 1993 ;  
von Fintel 1 999) . Later Chierchia (2000), Kadmon and Landman ( 1 993), Krifka 
( 1 994), Lahiri ( 1 998), Lee and Hom ( 1 995), and van Rooy (2002) claimed that 
[NPI] is not a diacritic either but a semantic property which, moreover, explains 
the role of DE-ness in NPI licensing. Heim ( 1 984) and von Fintel ( 1999) refine 
the DE-ness property to cover some prima facie counterexamples to Ladusaw' s  
generalization. 
Interrogatives are an embarrassment to this line of research, since they 
license NPIs but are not DE and do not fall under the modified concepts of DE­
ness either as is well known (Ladusaw 1 980; Linebarger 1980; Progovac 1 993) .  
This paper concentrates on a particular class of NPIs, the Minimizers . 
Minimizers like lift a finger, give a damn, etc . are have substantially different 
properties from other NPIs like ever, any, etc . One of the differences is illustrated 
below. Regular NPIs are licit in questions and are compatible with un-biased, 
information seeking readings as shown in ( 1 )  (see Guerzoni 2002; Han and Siegel 
1996) . Minimizers are also possible in interrogatives, but give rise obligatorily to 
rhetorical readings (Guerzoni 2002). Thus (2a) strongly suggests that Peter 
doesn't care about the environment at all , and (2b) likewise suggests that nobody 
cares about the environment at all . 
( 1 )  a. Has Peter done any wrong? 
b .  Who has done any wrong here? 
(2) a. Does Peter give a damn about the environment? 
b .  Who gives a damn about the environment? 
The aim of the present paper is to demonstrate that a proper lexical 
semantics for Minimizers together with certain non-standard assumptions about 
focal alternatives explains why Minimizers are possible in interrogatives in the 
first place and why they give rise obligatorily to rhetorical readings . Importantly, 
the Minimizers in (2) pattern with expressions that are transparently composed of 
a lower endpoint of a scale in combination with even as in (3) on the next page. 
The slightest bit denotes the lower endpoint on the scale of amounts . These 
expressions denoting scalar endpoints plus even also force rhetorical readings in 
© 2003 by Klaus Abels 
R. Young and Y. Zhou (eds), SALT XlII 1 - 1 8 ,  Ithaca, NY: Cornell University. 
2 Klaus Abels 
questions, and in general they have a distribution that is very similar to that of 
Minimizers (Heim 1 984) . 
(3) a. Does Peter care even the slightest bit about the environment? 
b .  Who cares even the slightest bit about the environment? 
The fact that Minimizers pattern with expressions that denote lower 
endpoints of a scale plus even and against regular NPIs is not surprising if we 
treat Minimizers , but not regular NPIs, as semantically equivalent to expressions 
denoting lower endpoints of a scale + even (see Guerzoni 2002 ; Heim 1 984; 
Krifka 1 995 ; Lahiri 1 998).  These authors offer independent motivation for this 
treatment that I cannot review here. I will follow them and assume a lexical 
semantics for Minimizers where they denote lower endpoints of a scale plus even. 
While the kind of pattern observed in ( 1 )-(3) is then unsurprising, Lahiri 
( 1 998) and Wilkinson ( 1 996) note that standard treatments of even predict neither 
that (2) and (3) are acceptable nor why such questions obligatorily get a rhetorical 
reading. 
In section 2, I briefly introduce my assumptions about even, which deviate 
slightly from the standard lexical semantics as given for example in Wilkinson 
1 996. 1 In section 3 I argue that the set of focus alternatives evoked by even is 
crucially larger than generally assumed. Section 4 explores the consequences of 
broadening the set of alternatives in this way and show how the judgments 
concerning (2) and (3) follow from these assumptions. Section 5 discusses some 
further independent support for broadening the set of focus alternatives . Section 6 
concludes the paper. 
2. Oneven 
It is commonly assumed that even has a lexical entry along the lines given in (4) 





[evend = A.P<s,t> A.w<s>: 
V'q<s,t>[[qEC & q "* p] � q >likely p] & 





Here even is truth-functionally inert. It is the identity function from 
propositions to propositions «4iii)) .  Even contributes two presuppositions,  
however. It  contributes a scalar presupposition, (4i), according to which the 
asserted proposition p is the least likely of all alternative propositions q from a 
contextually supplied set of alternatives, C. Even also contributes an existential 
presupposition, (4ii), according to which one of the alternative propositions in the 
contextually given set C must be true. The variable C, a set of propositions,  is an 
implicit contextual variable. 
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Before exemplifying (4) ,  consider (5). The lexical entry in (5) is logically 
equivalent to that in (4), but it brings out the double function of the Existential 
Presupposition. The Existential Presupposition in (4) says that the set of 
contextual alternatives must be non-trivial (5ii) and that it must contain a true 







V'q<s,t>[[qEC & q "" p] --7 q >likely p] & 
3q<s,t>[ qEC & q "" p] & 
3q<s,t>[ qEC & q "" p & q(w)]. 
p(w) 
Scalar presupposition 
Notriviality of C 
Existence of true alternative 
Assertion 
We now tum to example (6) to illustrate how (4/5) works. 
(6) John has solved even the hardest problem. 
According to (4/5) ,  example (6) asserts that John solved the hardest 
problem «5iv» and presupposes «5i» that the hardest problem was the least 
likely one for John to solve, «5ii» that there is at least one other problem under 
discussion, (5iii) that John solved at least one of the other problems under 
discussion. 
Suppose there are nine problems (problem #1 -#9), problem #9 being the 
hardest. Example (6) should thus be felicitous if John solved problems #1 , #9 , and 
no other problem. This is false. Example (6) is only felicitous if John solved all 
relevant problems including the hardest one. It is not sufficient that he solved just 
one of the relevant problems. Rather, he must have solved all of them (see for 
relevant discussion and possible further refinements Kay 1 990; van Rooy 2002) . 
We can implement this by making (5iii) presuppose the truth of all (relevant) 
alternatives as in (7iii) .2 
(7) [evend= AP<s,t> AW<s>: 
(i) V'q<s,t>[[qEC & q "" p] --7 q >likely p] & 
(ii) 3q<s,t>[ qEC & q "" p] & 
(iii) V'q<s,t>[[qEC & q "" p] --7 q(w)] 
(iv) p(w) 
Scalar presupposition 
Notriviality of C 
Truth of all alternatives 
Assertion 
The remainder of the paper is based on (7) as the lexical entry for even. I 
will assume that in this form even is a semantic component of the Minimizers. 
3. Introducing an additional alternative 
In both of the lexical entries for even discussed in the previous section, the 
contextual restriction on even, the variable C, remained implicit. It is not 
syntactically realized independently. When hearing a sentence with even or a 
Minimizer, cooperative hearers construct a suitable value for C that will make the 
utterance maximally relevant, coherent, informative, etc. This process is 
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independently needed for example to account for the fact that quantifiers are 
contextually restricted and to generate a non-contradictory reading in examples 
like (8) .  
(8) Everybodyc's computer is faster than John's. 
Without a suitable contextual restriction on everybody, sentence (8) would 
entail the contradiction that John's computer is faster than itself. C must be 
restricted somehow to avoid this. 
Assume for concreteness that C is a subset of the focus semantic value of 
the LF-sister of even - even associates obligatorily with focus. A familiar 
Roothian (Rooth 1 992) way of implementing this is given in (9).3 
(9) Let a be the sister of even at LF, 
[at be the focus semantic value of a, and 
C the contextual restriction on even, 
then Cc[at. 
In the case at hand, [a] denotes a proposition, because even is a partial 
function from a proposition to a proposition (type «s,t>, <s, t»). Therefore [at 
denotes a set of propositions, the denotation of a question. I suggest modifying (9) 
in one crucial respect and to use (10) instead. 
(10) Let a be the sister of even at LF, 
[at be the focus semantic value of a, 
C the contextual restriction on even, and 
W the set of possible worlds, 
then C c ([at u {W - u[at}). 
The set of propositions in (10) from which C may be constructed is 
crucially a proper superset of the set from which C may be constructed according 
to (9) The set in (10) includes all the usual focus alternatives to [a] and also the 
negation of their disjunction, i.e. the proposition that all focus alternatives are 
simultaneously false. I will call the Negation Of the Disjunction of focal 
alternatives, i.e. {W - u[at}. NOD in what follows. The consequence of 
assuming ( 1 0) in an example like (6) above is that all propositions of the form 
that John solved problem #n and the proposition that John solved no problem may 
be considered in constructing C. 
3.1 Defending (10) 
(10) looks fairly ad hoc at first. I will show in section 4 how assuming (1 0), i .e .  
potentially including NOD in C, accounts for the rhetorical effect. First I will 
illustrate though that NOD plays a role elsewhere in the grammar as for example 
in interrogatives and in focus constructions without even. The claim is that if P is 
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a set of propositions,  it is quite common that W -uP plays a linguistically 
significant role. 
A first indication that this claim may be correct, comes from the following 
remark that Karttunen ( 1 977: 1 8  ft. 1 1 ) makes : "John knows whether Mary cooks 
or Bill eats out [is] true just in case John knows every proposition in the set 
denoted by whether Mary cooks or Bill eats out provided that the set is non­
empty, and in the event it is, just in case John knows that it is empty, i .e .  knows 
that Mary doesn't cook and Bill doesn't eat out" . According to Karttunen, for 
John to know Q, Q a set of propositions (Hamblin 1 973), John has to know which 
member(s) of the set Q u {W - uQ} is/are true. John has to know which 
members of the Hamblin denotation of a question are true or he has to know that 
NOD is true. 
It is sometimes suggested that NOD (W - uQ) is a possible but not an 
altogether regular rejoinder to a wh-interrogative. Note that NOD involves the 
negative quantifier nobody in place of the wh-word. The implicit assumption is 
that if nobody is licit in place of the wh-word, then other quantifiers should be as 
well . That this is not the case is shown in ( 1 1 ) ,  which can easily be answered by 
asserting NOD «( 1 la)), but using quantifiers other than nobody in the answer 
gives odd results «lib) and ( 1Ic)) . 
( 1 1 )  A: Who came? 
a. B:'/ Nobody did. 
b. B: # Some people did. 
c. B: # More than three people did. 
Especially examples like ( 1 lc) could potentially be used to motivate the 
claim that answers with quantifiers are not members of the question set per se. 
This was, of course, Hamblin's original position. Such a ban against quantifiers in 
place of wh-words would also rule out ( 1 lb), but it incorrectly rules out ( 1la) as 
well. It would then have to be true that ( l 1 a) is indeed ruled out as a regular 
answer to the question, and that in ( 1 l a) an existential presupposition of the 
question is rejected.4 NOD would then not be an answer to the question but a 
presupposition rejecting rejoinder. 
The question then arises whether ( 1 l a) ,  i .e .  NOD, patterns with regular 
answers or whether it patterns with rejoinders to questions that clearly reject 
presuppositions of questions. In fact, NOD patterns with regular answers. 
Consider example ( 1 2) on the following page, where the presence of why 
introduces the presupposition you ate an apple. Rejecting this presupposition 
must be specially marked either in terms of intonation ( 1 2b )-( 1 2c) or by lexical 
means ( 1 2d) . Rejecting the presupposition is impossible without such marking 
( 1 2a) . Moreover, when the presupposition is not rejected ( 1 2e)-( 1 2h) , the special 
marking is impossible. 
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( l 2) A: Why did you eat an apple? 
a. B: # I didn't eat an(y) apple. 
b .  B:.t I didn't EAT an(y) apple. 
c. B:.t I DIDN'T eat an(y) apple. 
d. B:.t But I didn't eat an(y) apple. 
e.  B:.t I didn't do it for any particular reason. 
f. B: # I didn't DO it for any particular reason 
g. B: # I DIDN'T do it for any particular reason 
h. B: # But I didn't do it for any particular reason. 
The special devices in ( l 2b)- ( l 2c) are thus used in an answer iff a 
presupposition of the question is to be rejected. We can therefore use these special 
devices to diagnose whether an answer rejects a presupposition of a question. In 
( l l a) ,  no such special device is present, or indeed possible (( 1 3». 
( 1 3) Who came? 
a. .t Nobody did. 
b.  # But nobody did. 
c. # Nobody DID (come) . 
From this it follows that NOD (W - uQ) must be considered an admissible regular 
answer to a question. It is neither the case that all quantifiers must be treated that 
way (( lIb-c», nor is it the case that NOD rejects a presupposition of the 
interrogative. The issue of the quantifier in place of the wh-word is a red herring. 
We can now briefly turn to focus constructions . Consider the polar 
interrogative in ( l4) with marked stress on John. In all the answers ( l4a-d) the 
question is negated. In ( 14a) one of the alternatives to John, Mary, is asserted. 
NOD, the sentence with nobody in ( l4b), behaves on a par with ( l4a) , sentences 
with other quantifiers like somebody and most people in ( l4c) and ( l4d) do not. 
Again this suggests that quantifiers do not generally act as alternatives to proper 
names and that NOD is a licit alternative independently of the quantifier issue. 
( 14) A: Did JOHN go to the party? 
a. B:.t No, MARY did. 
b. B:.t No, NOBODY did. 
c. B: # No, SOMEBODY did 
d. B: # No, MOST people did. 
From the facts discussed in this subsection I conclude that NOD 
(W- u[at) is involved generally in constructing answers to question and as alter­
natives in focus constructions . It is then not surprising that we find NOD playing 
a role in the interpretation of sentences with even as we will see in the next 
sections. 
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4. The Explanation: Minimizers in Questions 
4.1 Polar Questions 
We can now return to the initial puzzle : the behavior Minimizers in questions. I 
will first discuss polar interrogatives like example (2a) repeated here for 
reference. Crucial properties of the LF of example (2a) are given in the labeled 
bracketing in ( 1 5) .  
(2) a .  Does Peter give a damn about the environment? 
( 1 5) [Qpolar [xp even [Peter cares to the [minimal] Poe degree about the 
environment]]] 
Following Hamblin ( 1 973) I assume that polar interrogatives denote two 
membered sets of propositions {p, -,p}. The question forming operator for polar 
questions, Qpolar, given in ( 1 6) achieves this result. It is a function from 
propositions to sets of propositions. 
( 1 6) [QpolarJ = AP<s,t>.Aq<s,t>. [q = p v q = AW .-,p(W)] 
A question arises how presuppositions carried by the sister of the 
interrogative operator are treated. I assume that the members of the question set 
each inherit the presuppositions of the proposition expressed in the question. In 
other words, both members of [( 1 5)] presuppose whatever [XP] in ( 1 5) 
presupposes. [XP] is a proposition with even, thus it carries the relevant 
presuppositions. According to the lexical entry of even arrived at in section 2, 
these are the presuppositions in ( 1 7) .  ( 1 7i) says that for Peter to care minimally 
about the environment is the least likely of the relevant set of alternatives . ( 1 7ii) 
says that the set of alternatives must not be trivial, and ( 17iii) says that all relevant 
alternatives in C must be true. 
( 1 7) (i) 'v'q<s,t>[ [qEC & q *" that Peter cares to the minimal degree about the 
environment] � q >likely that Peter cares to the minimal degree about 
the environment] 
(ii) 3q<s,t>[ qEC & q *" that Peter cares to the minimal degree about the 
environment] 
(iii)'v'q<s,t>[ [qEC & q *" that Peter cares to the minimal degree about the 
environment] � q(w)] 
This characterization of the interpretation of XP still leaves open the exact 
value of the contextual variable C, the set of alternatives to be considered. We 
know from ( 1 0) above that as a boundary condition C c ([Xpt u {W - u[Xpt}). 
Consider now three different possible values for C. 
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( 1 8) a. Value 1 :  
b .  Value 2 :  




C={that Peter cares to the minimal degree about the 
environment, that Peter cares to a certain (small) degree 
about the environment, that Peter cares to a large degree 
about the environment} 
C= {that Peter does not care about the environment; that 
Peter cares to the minimal degree about the 
environment}= {W - u[Xpt, p} 
C={that Peter does not care about the environment}= 
{W - u[Xpt} 
Value 1 (( 1 8a» is not a possible value for C, because of ( 1 7ii), i .e .  because 
any utterance of (2a) presupposes that the set of alternatives is not trivial .  
Value 2 (( 1 8b» is likewise not a possible value for C. Value 2 is 
impossible because of ( 1 7i), i .e .  because of the scalar presupposition of even (see 
Lahiri 1998).  To see this, consider the following where p stands for the 
proposition that Peter cares to the minimal degree about the environment and q 
fore one of the alternatives from C, e.g. that Peter cares to a large degree about 
the environment. q entails p (q -7 p, i .e .  q c p) because caring a lot about the 
environment entails caring to the minimal degree. p on the other hand does not 
entail q (..., [p -7 q] , or in other words p ct. q) because caring to the minimal degree 
about the environment does not entail caring to a large degree. In other words, q 
asymmetrically entails p (qcp). From this it follows that Iql<lpl.5 If as in this case 
there are less worlds compatible with q than with p, then q is less likely than p 
(q <likely p). But ( 1 7i) demands on the contrary that q >likely p.  
The same is true for all possible values of C which include propositions of 
the form that Peter cares to degree d about the environment, where d is greater 
than the minimal degree. 
Finally, value 3 is in principle possible. It is possible that NOD (that Peter 
doesn't care about the environment at all) is more likely than p (that Peter cares 
to the environment to the minimal degree) (( 17i». If C is assigned value 3 ,  C is 
non-trivial (( 17ii». And, according to ( 17iii) NOD must be true. 
The discussion shows that the compositional interpretation of (2a) together 
with the presuppositions of even force one particular value for C, value 3 .  
Although generally the value of  C is determined pragmatically ,  pragmatics has no 
job to do in this particular case. Consider now how value 3 for C plays out in the 
example. Remember that by assumption every member of the question inherits 
individually the presuppositions of the underlying proposition. The final result of 
interpreting ( 1 5) is shown in ( 19) .  Crucially the positive and the negative answers 
to the question carry the same presuppositions : that Peter doesn't care about the 
environment and for Peter to care to the minimal degree about the environment is 
less likely than for him not to care about the environment at all. 
( 19) [(2a)] = { 
assert :  p=that Peter cares to the minimal degree about the environ­
ment 
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presuppose: q=that Peter doesn ' t  care about the environment & 
p is less likely than q; 
assert: -,p=that Peter doesn' t  care to the minimal degree about the 
environment 
presuppose: q=that Peter doesn' t  care about the environment 
p is less likely than q 
} 
Notice that if the presupposition that Peter doesn' t  care about the 
environment is already entailed by the discourse, then the question (2a) is not an 
open question any more. If we assume that only open questions can be asked 
felicitously (Roberts 1998),  then it should be impossible to ask question (2a) in a 
context that already entails this presupposition. The presupposition must therefore 
be introduced by the question. I will assume that a cooperative hearer 
accommodates the presuppositions carried by a question when admitting it into 
the discourse. The hearer, we have just seen, always has to accommodate the 
presupposition 'that Peter doesn' t  care about the environment' when admitting 
(2a) into a discourse. The updated context after accommodation entails that Peter 
doesn' t  care about the environment at all . 
This explains the rhetorical effect. Any utterance of (2a) will force a 
cooperative hearer to accommodate the presupposition that Peter doesn ' t  care 
about the environment. What is felt to be the content of the rhetorical question is 
not actually asserted, it is merely presupposed. The entire process is fully 
determined since, in particular, the choice of the contextual restriction on even is 
automatic as discussed above. 
In this sense rhetorical questions with Minimizers are on a par with 
examples where new information is introduced merely as a presupposition. 
Another example of this type (based on an example in Roberts 1 998) is given 
below as (20) . Imagine that the interlocuter does not know that Sam cheated on 
his wife. 
(20) Isn't it shocking that Sam cheated on his wife? 
The presupposition of a rhetorical question is insinuated in just the way 
that (20) insinuates that Sam cheated on his wife. This concludes the discussion of 
the rhetorical effect for non-negated polar questions. 
4.2 Aside on Declaratives 
A question that arises immediately, is this :  What is the impact of allowing NOD 
to enter into the construction of C in declaratives? The answer in short is none. To 
see this consider example (2 1 )  first.6 
(2 1 )  * Peter gives a damn about the environment. 
(22) [xp even [Peter cares to the [minimal]Foc degree about the environment]] 
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Example (2 1 )  is predicted to be ungrammatical whether NOD may enter 
into the construction of C or not. Relevant properties of the LF for (2 1 )  are shown 
in (22) (c.f. ( 1 5) above) . The options for C are again the alternatives given in 
( 1 8a-c).  As before, choosing either ( 1 8a) or ( 1 8b) leads to contradictory 
presuppositions because either Non-triviality (7ii) or the Scalar Presupposition 
(7i) will be violated. This leaves value 3 «( 1 8c» as the only non-contradictory 
value for C: C={W - u[Xpt}. Although choosing value 3 ensures that the 
presuppositions of the sentence are consistent, the presuppositions now contradict 
the assertion, since (2 1 ) ,  given value 3, presupposes that Peter doesn' t  care about 
the environment but asserts that he does care, albeit only to the minimal degree. 
This is shown in (23) .  
(23) assert: p=that Peter cares to the minimal degree about the 
environment 
presuppose: q=that Peter doesn' t  care about the environment & 
p is less likely than q; 
There is then no way to chose a value for C which leads to a consistent 
result, which explains why (2 1 )  is degraded. 
Examfle (24) with the sketched LF in (25) ,  is predicted to be 
grammatical .  
(24) "'Peter doesn' t  give a damn about the environment. 
(25) [xp even [Peter does not care to the [minimal]Foc degree about the 
environment]] 
From the literature on even we know that a theory which assumes (9) 
rather than ( 1 0), i.e. a theory without NOD, is capable of generating the relevant 
readings of (24) . The only worry is whether including NOD in the construction of 
C leads to overgeneration. Since even in this case scopes above negation, NOD 
will be the following proposition: It is false that Peter doesn' t  care about the 
environment at all or that Peter cares to the environment to some small degree or 
. . .  or that Peter cares about the environment to a large degree. In other words, 
NOD is the proposition that Peter cares to some degree about the environment. 
The inclusion of NOD in C entails in conjunction with (7iii), Truth of All 
Alternatives, that Peter cares about the environment. At the same time (24), 
asserts that Peter doesn' t  care about the environment at all .  This contradiction 
makes any value for C which includes NOD unusable for examples like (24) . 
Consequently, the availability of NOD in principle does not have any unwanted 
consequences for example (24) and negated declaratives in general . 
The brief discussion in this subsection was meant to illustrate that the 
availability of NOD as a candidate for the inclusion in C does not lead to any 
unwanted predictions for declaratives . 
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4.3 Negated polar interrogatives 
I will now very briefly discuss negated polar interrogatives . Negated polar 
interrogatives like (26) are unproblematic for my account. They are not 
necessarily rhetorical questions. In the LF even takes scope above negation as 
shown in (27) (see the parallel declarative (24) with LF (25) and fn. 7) .  
(26) Doesn' t  John give a damn about the environment? 
(27) [Qpolar [xp even [Peter does not care to the [minimal]poc degree about the 
environment]]] 
Such examples can be combined consistently with presuppositions that do 
not involve NOD. We saw this above in the discussion of the completely parallel 
example (24) . As before these same presuppositions will be inherited by both 
members of the question set. Given the presuppositions that come with (24), (26) 
can be used as a regular interrogative. It presupposes that John doesn ' t  care a lot 
about the environment and asks whether he cares to the minimal degree or not at 
all . As far as I can tell this is the interpretation the example actually has . Negated 
polar interrogatives are thus unproblematic. 
4.3 Minimizers in wh-interrogatives 
We now turn to example (2b) repeated here for convenience. The LF for this 
example is sketched in (28) . Example (2b) again denotes a set of propositions. 
Ignoring presuppositions, this is the set in (29).  
(2) b. Who gives a damn about the environment? 
(28) [Who} Qwh [ even [t} cares to the [minimal]p degree about the 
environment]]] 
(29) [(2b)]={p<s,t>1 3x p=AW. X cares about the environment to the minimal 
degree} 
= { that Peter cares about the environment to the minimal degree, 
that Mary cares about the environment to the minimal degree, 
that Frank cares about the environment to the minimal degree, . . .  } 
Each of the propositions in (29) comes with its own set of presuppositions. 
For the various values of x (Peter, Mary, Frank, . . .  ) these presuppositions are as in 
(30) . 
(30) (i) 'v'q<s,t>[ [qEC & q "I: that x cares to the minimal degree about the 
environment] � q >likely that x cares to the minimal degree about the 
environment] 
(ii) 3q<s,t>[ qEC & q "I: that x cares to the minimal degree about the 
environment] 
(iii)'v'q<s,t>[ [qEC & q "I: that x cares to the minimal degree about the 
environment] � q(w)] 
1 1  
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And as before we need to ask the question what values of C are possible, 
where the boundary condition from ( 1 0) only says C c ([Xp]f U {W - u[Xpt}). 
Consider again the now familiar three types of values . 
(31 ) a. Value 1 :  
b .  Value 2 :  
c .  Value 3: 
or 
C=00r C={p} 
C={ that x cares to the minimal degree about the 
environment, that x cares to a certain (small) degree about 
the environment, that x cares to a large degree about the 
environment} 
C={that x does not care about the environment; that x cares 
to the minimal degree about the environment} = 
{W - u[Xpt, p} 
C={that x does not care about the environment}= 
{W - u[Xpt} 
Value 1 «(31a» is not a possible value for C, because of ( 17ii) , i .e .  because 
any utterance of (2b) presupposes that the set of alternatives is not trivial .  
Value 2 «31b» is likewise not a possible value for C .  Value 2 is  
impossible because of ( 1 7i) , i .e .  because of the scalar presupposition of even. To 
see this consider the following where again p stands for the proposition that x 
cares to the minimal degree about the environment and q for one of the 
alternatives from C,  e .g .  that x cares to a large degree about the environment. q 
entails p (q -7 p, i .e .  q c p) because caring a lot about the environment entails 
caring to the minimal degree. p on the other hand does not entail q (-, [p -7 q], or 
in other words p ct. q) because caring to the minimal degree about the environment 
does not entail caring to a large degree. In other words, q asymmetrically entails p 
(qcp) . From this it follows that Iq l< lp l . If as in this case there are less worlds 
compatible with q than with p, then q is less likely than p (q <likely p) . But ( 1 7i) 
demands on the contrary that q >likely p. 
The same is true for all possible values of C which include propositions of 
the form that x cares to degree d about the environment, where d is greater than 
the minimal degree. 
Finally, value 3 is in principle possible. It is possible that NOD (that x 
doesn't care about the environment at all) is more likely than p (that x cares to 
the environment to the minimal degree) «17i» . If C is assigned value 3 ,  C is non­
trivial «17ii» . And, according to ( 17iii) NOD must be true. 
The fully fleshed out interpretation of example (2b) is given in (32) . 
(32) [(2b)]= { 
assert : Pl=that Peter cares about the environment to the minimal 
degree 
presuppose : qI=that Peter doesn 't  care about the environment 
PI is less likely than qI, 
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assert: P2=that Mary cares about the environment to the minimal 
degree 
presuppose: q2=that Mary doesn' t  care about the environment 
P2 is less likely than q2, 
assert : P3=that Frank cares about the environment to the minimal 
degree 
presuppose: q3=that Frank doesn' t  care about the environment 
P3 is less likely than q3, 
. . .  } 
(32) amounts to saying that for every individual x (the range for the 
variable x is determined by the contextual restriction on who), the proposition that 
x does not care about the environment is accommodated. The question 
presupposes that for all relevant x, x doesn' t  care about the environment. s As in 
the case of the polar interrogative, this presuppositions accounts for the rhetorical 
effect. What is intuitively felt as the content of the rhetorical question is never 
asserted, it is a presupposition that is automatically accommodated. 
We have seen in this section how the lexical entry of even in (7) together 
with the assumption that NOD can be used in the construction of the contextual 
restriction on even (( 1 0» account in a natural way for the emergence of the 
rhetorical effect. 
5 Additional evidence for including NOD in the construction of C 
Consider examples (33) through (36). (A version of (34) was first pointed out to 
me by Yael Sharvit (p .c .) . )  
(33) .IJohn would like to know which of his friends give a damn about the 
environment and which don' t. 
(34) #John believes that people are more likely to care about the environment 
than not to care about it, and he would (actually) like to know which of his 
friends give a damn about the environment and which don ' t. 
(35) .IJohn believes that people are more likely not to care about the 
environment than to care about it, and he would (actually) like to know 
which of his friends give a damn about the environment and which don ' t. 
(36) .IJohn believes that people are morelless likely to care about the 
environment than not to care about it, and he would like to know which of 
his friends care about the environment and which don't .  
Examples (33) and (35) show that embedded questions with Minimizers 
are in principle acceptable. 9 However, in the context provided in (34), the same 
question is decidedly odd. The oddness of (34) must be attributed to the 
interaction of the Minimizer in the question with the context. It is not in principle 
odd to ask the question intended in (34), as (36) shows. 
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The oddness of (34) must somehow be attributed to the presence of a 
minimzer in (34) together with the particular context given there. When the 
context is changed the oddness disappears as (35) shows. 
The explanation why example (34) is degraded but (35) isn ' t  is quite 
straightforward. The first conjunct question in (33) through (35) is in relevant 
respects identical to (2b) . We saw above that (2b) presupposes for all relevant 
individuals that caring about the environment is less likely than not caring. This 
presupposition is explicitly denied in (34) but not in (33) and (35) .  This accounts 
for why (34) but not (33) and (35) is odd. Without assuming that the likelihood of 
NOD (that the relevant people are less likely to care about the environment than 
not to care) enters into the interpretation of questions with Minimizers , the 
different status of (34) and (35) remains mysterious .  This casts some doubt on 
accounts of the rhetorical effect that are not based on the availability of NOD (e.g. 
Guerzoni 2002; Han 2002) . 
I now briefly turn to the open issue of the lack of a rhetorical effect in 
(33) . According to the discussion of (2b) above, the first conjunct question in (33) 
through (35) should have the presuppositions in (37).  
(37) For the various values of x (Peter, Mary, Frank, . . .  ) : 
(i) 'v'q<s,t>[[qEC & q "* that x cares to the minimal degree about the 
environment] � q >likely that x cares to the minimal degree about the 
environment] 
(ii) :3q<s,t>[ qEC & q "* that x cares to the minimal degree about the 
environment] 
(iii) 'v'q<s,t>[ [qEC & q "* that x cares to the minimal degree about the 
environment] � q(w)] 
The only value for C that yields consistent presuppositions is value 3 (i .e. 
(31c» above. The rhetorical effect arises from this forced choice of a value for C 
because of presupposition (37iii) - Truth of all alternatives . It follows from (37iii) 
and value 3 for C that none of the relevant individuals care to the minimal degree 
about the environment. The absence of the rhetorical effect in (33) through (35) 
then indicates that presupposition (iii) can be and is canceled in these contexts. 
The actual presuppositions of (33) through (35) are only those in (38) .  
(38) For the various values of x (Peter, Mary, Frank, . . .  ) : 
(i) 'v'q<s,t>[ [qEC & q "* that x cares to the minimal degree about the 
environment] � q >likely that x cares to the minimal degree about the 
environment] 
(ii) :3q<s,t>[ qEC & q "* that x cares to the minimal degree about the 
environment] 
Note that assuming (38) does not jeopardize our explanation for the 
contrast between (34) and (35) .  The presupposition crucial in the explanation of 
the contrast between (34) and (35) was not the cancelled presupposition (37iii) but 
rather the scalarity presupposition (37i), which is not canceled (38i) . 10 
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The rhetorical effect can be absent in embedded interrogatives with 
Minimizers more generally . This amounts to saying that under contextual pressure 
the Truth of All Alternatives presupposition of even ((7iii» can be canceled. We 
know, of course, that presuppositions can sometimes be canceled. Thus the 
existence presupposition attributed to the definite article on Strawson' s  view of 
definite descriptions is canceled in the following exchange. A: Is the king of 
France bald? - B: No, the king of France isn't bald. France doesn't have a king. 
Consider now example (39).  
(39) Context: My friend Kirsten, who has a bad back, has recently moved while 
I was away. I was hoping that some other people would help her move the 
heavy boxes . People are giving evasive answers to the question how many 
boxes they carried. 
In mounting desperation I ask: 
Who of you even lifted a finger to help Kirsten? 
In example (39) the relevant value for the restriction on even again con­
tains NOD: that x didn' t  do anything to help Kirsten. In the particular context, the 
speaker is not in a position to make this presupposition since he wasn ' t  present. 
He doesn' t  know NOD and his interlocuters know that he doesn' t  know. The pre­
supposition that NOD be true is then canceled and the question can be interpreted 
as a non-rhetorical ,  real question. The same happens in (33) through (35) .  
We have seen in this section that the contrast between (34) and (35) falls 
out from the present account, where NOD may enter into the construction of the 
contextual restriction on even. In fact, an account of the contrast between these 
examples that does not involve NOD at all seems difficult. Other accounts 
(Guerzoni 2002; Han 2002) do not invoke NOD and hence make no comparable 
prediction. This can be taken as an argument for the present account. 
6. Conclusion 
I have provided a novel account of the rhetorical effect of Minimizers in 
Interrogatives . Minimizers were analyzed as semantically equivalent to scalar 
endpoints + even (Heim 1984). 
The account rests crucially on the assumption that the contextual 
restriction on even may contain a member not included in the focus semantic 
value of the LF-sister of even, the negation of its disjunction. 
( 1 0) Let a be the sister of even at LF, 
[a]f be the focus semantic value of a, 
C the contextual restriction on even, and 
W the set of possible worlds, 
then C c ([a]f u {W - u[a]f}). 
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This assumption not only accounts for the rhetorical effect, it appears to be 
a necessary ingredient of any account of the contrast between examples like (34) 
and (35) .  The assumption that W-uP (NOD) plays a role is independently 
justified for interrogatives and focus constructions as shown in section 3 .  
Endnotes 
* This paper grew out of my second general examinations paper. lowe 
tremendous thanks to my committee Sigrid Beck, Yael Sharvit, and Howard 
Lasnik. Outside of my committee I would like to thank Elena Guerzoni and Luisa 
Marti. I would also like to thank the audiences at the Fourth UConn-UMass-MIT 
Semantics Workshop, at the NELS 33 poster session, at the Penn Linguistic 
Colloquium 27, and, of course, at SALT XIII. All errors and shortcomings are my 
own. 
I Note that the research program aimed at eliminating [+/- NPI] as a primitive, a 
diacritic, from the theory forces us to adopt the scope theory of even (Karttunen 
and Peters 1 979;  Wilkinson 1996) . Rooth 's  (1 985) competing ambiguity theory of 
even distinguishes the two lexical entries of even with the diacritic [+/-NPI]. The 
ambiguity theory must for that reason be rejected. 
2 Notice that the truth of (7iii) follows from the assertion (5iv) iff the alternatives 
form a true scale. The crucial property of example (6) is that the different 
alternatives do not form a scale a priori . There is no necessary link between 
solving problem #n and solving problem #m. 
3 The Roothian way of implementing association with focus is chosen for 
concreteness only. Nothing hinges on it as far as I can see. In particular, if the set 
of focal alternatives is not determined syntactically as the LF sister of even but is 
given pragmatically as a question under discussion (see for example Marti 2003 ; 
Roberts 1998),  C will have to be a subset of that question and the modification in 
(10) will have to be made to the question under discussion. Given the discussion 
in section 3. 1 below, this would be a natural move. 
4 If we assume that the question in (1 1 )  carries the existential presupposition that 
somebody came, then (lIb) but not ( 1 1  c) is predicted to be odd independently of 
a ban against quantified answers in the question set, because (lib) is totally 
uninformative and simply asserts what is already presupposed. 
5 If P and q are finite sets, the step from qcp to Iql<lpl is trivial ,  but not if they are 
infinite. I will ignore the issue here. 
6 I will only discuss the two simplest cases , (2 1 )  and (24), here. For discussion of 
other cases see Abels 2002. 
7 It is noted in the literature (e.g .  Lahiri 1 998 ; Wilkinson 1 996) that even must 
scope above negation in negated monoclausal examples. The reasons for this are 
unclear. 
8 The situation is actually a little more complicated. In polar interrogatives it 
seems to be true that the presuppositions of the interrogative can simply be 
accommodated; thus, consider (i) in a context that does not entail that Peter 
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smoked at some point. Example (ii) on the other hand does not presuppose that all 
addressees smoked at some point. 
(i) Has Peter quit smoking? 
(ii) Which of you have quit smoking? 
The question is where the line is between accommodating the presuppositions for 
all relevant individuals (as seems to be necessary to derive the rhetorical effect) 
and accommodating only an existentially quantified version according to which 
there is at least one individual that fulfills the presuppositions (which seems to be 
sufficient for examples like (ii)) .  I do not at present have an answer to this 
question. 
9 Notice that the rhetorical effect is absent in example (33) . I tum to this issue in a 
moment. 
10 The fact that the Truth of All Alternatives presupposition is cancelable is 
interesting in light of the discussion of that presupposition in section (3) of this 
paper. Further care in formulating the presupposition (see Kay 1 990) might shed 
light on the issue why this presupposition can be canceled but others cannot. 
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